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Introduction
In 1939, Congress enacted the modem form of the Internal Reve-
nue Code,1 which details the sources of income that are taxable2 and
those that are excluded from taxation.3 Section 104(a)(2) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code states that damages received on account of per-
sonal injury or sickness are excludable from gross income, and thus
not taxable.4 In 1989, Congress amended section 104(a)(2) to prevent
punitive damages awarded in nonphysical injury and nonphysical sick-
ness cases from qualifying for the exclusion provided under the stat-
ute.5 Since this congressional enactment, courts have interpreted the
meaning of section 104(a)(2) differently, resulting in the disparate tax
treatment by federal income taxpayers of punitive damage awards in
physical injury cases.6
The Uniformity Clause of the Constitution requires that federal
income taxes be uniformly imposed on taxpayers throughout the
United States.7 The purpose of the Uniformity Clause is to prevent
any preference of taxpayers in one state or region of the country over
1. After the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in February 1913, which explic-
itly gave Congress the power to "lay and collect taxes on incomes from whatever source
derived," Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1913. See DOUGLAS A. KAHN, FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 1-2 (2d ed. 1992). In 1939, Congress codified the revenue acts that it had
passed from 1913 to 1939 in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Id.
2. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 61 (1994).
3. See, e.g., id. §§ 102, 104 (1994).
4. In pertinent part, section 104(a) provides:
(a) [G]ross income does not include:
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and
whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or
sickness;
Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a
case not involving physical injury or physical sickness.
I.R.C. § 104(a) (1994).
Federal income taxation is based on the concept of gross income. If an item of income
is "included" in gross income, then it is included (subject to any allowable deductions re-
lated to that item) when determining taxable income. If an item is "excluded" from gross
income, then it is not subject to taxation. See KAHN, supra note 1, at 34-188.
5. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(a), 103
Stat. 2106, 2379 (1989) (codified at I.R.C. § 104(a)). Generally, the Act expressly affected
the exclusion of punitive damage awards on account of nonphysical injury or nonphysical
sickness cases recovered after July 10, 1989. See generally Margaret Henning, Recent De-
velopments in the Tax Treatment of Personal Injury and Punitive Damage Recoveries, 45
TAx LAW. 783 (1992).
6. Compare Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 2576 (1995) (holding section 104(a)(2) does not allow exclusion of any punitive dam-
age recovery) with Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 630 n.9 (6th Cir. 1994) (expressly
disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Hawkins, and holding punitive damages
received on account of a personal, tort-type claim are excluded from gross income).
7. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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similarly situated taxpayers in another area of the country.8 To apply
section 104(a)(2) uniformly among federal income taxpayers, as re-
quired under the Uniformity Clause, the judiciary must reach an
agreement on the meaning of this statute.
Part I of this Note focuses on relevant Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) interpretations9 of section 104(a)(2) and the latest congressional
amendment to that section. Part II analyzes two recent decisions by
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits that reached different conclusions on the
ability to exclude punitive damage recoveries in physical injury or
physical sickness cases under section 104(a)(2). Part III suggests that
these disparate interpretations of section 104(a)(2) by different cir-
cuits violate the intent and purpose of the Constitution's Uniformity
Clause. Part IV outlines a solution to remedy these violations by set-
ting out a procedure to be followed by federal courts and the IRS
when courts reach different conclusions on the meaning of a tax stat-
ute. Part V concludes that this issue, however resolved, deserves a
swift resolution so that the burden of taxation is shared equally among
similarly situated federal income taxpayers.
I. History of Internal Revenue Code Section 104(a)(2)
A. Revenue Act of 1918
Section 213(b)(6)10 of the Revenue Act of 1918 was the first time
Congress excluded personal injury awards from taxable income." At
that time, Congress based this exclusion on the theory that a personal
recovery is compensation for loss of human capital 2 and not in-
come. 13 That is, the damages recovered in a personal injury case were
8. See infra notes 151-155 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 21.
10. Section 213(b)(6) was the precursor to section 104(a)(2). See James D. Egleston,
Taxation of Punitive Damage Awards from Personal Injury Actions: Should the Section
104(a)(2) Exclusion Apply?, 20 OHio N.U. L. REv. 117, 121 (1993); see also Henning,
supra note 5, at 784. For a lengthy discussion of the history of section 104(a)(2) and one
author's belief of the theoretically correct treatment of punitive damages, see James
Serven, The Taxation of Punitive Damages: Horton Lays an Egg?, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 215
(1995).
11. See Henning, supra note 5, at 784 n.6 (referencing Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18,
§ 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066 (1919)).
12. See Henning, supra note 5, at 784.
13. Cf. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (reversing a line of
cases by holding that punitive damages received in an antitrust suit were not a return of
capital, but rather income). "The long history of departmental rulings holding personal
injury recoveries nontaxable on the theory that they roughly correspond to a return of
capital cannot support exemption of punitive damages following injury to property." Id. at
432 n.8. But see Timothy R. Palmer, Note, Internal Revenue Code Section 104(a) (2) and the
Exclusion of Personal Injury Damages: A Model of Inconsistency, 15 J. CORP. L. 83, 124-25
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awarded in "an attempt to make the [injured party] whole,' 1 4 and not
to place the injured party in a better position than before the accident.
After the enactment of section 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918,
subsequent interpretations of the statute15 expanded the exclusion of
income to nonphysical Xpersonal injuries such as defamation,'16 libel,17
and slander.' In 19751 and 1984,20 the IRS issued Revenue Rulings2'
describing the IRS interpretation of the taxation of punitive damages
under section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, which is the
present codification of section 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918.
B. Prior to Revenue Ruling 75-45
Prior to the IRS publication of Revenue Ruling 75-45, the United
States Supreme Court in 1955 decided Commissioner v. Glenshaw
Glass Co.3 Although Glenshaw Glass involved fraud and antitrust
issues, and thus the decision did not directly interpret section
104(a)(2), the decision made a distinction between punitive and com-
pensatory damages when deciding whether a damage award must be
included in gross income for purposes of computing federal income
tax.24 Specifically, the Court in Glenshaw Glass held that punitive
damages received for injuries resulting from fraud and antitrust viola-
tions must be included in gross income.25 In its analysis, the Court
stated that the IRS had previously allowed personal injury recoveries
to be exempt from taxation only when the recovery "roughly corre-
(1989) (arguing that the statement made by the Court in footnote eight of Glenshaw Glass
is pure dicta as it applies only in antitrust cases, not physical injury cases).
14. See Henning, supra note 5, at 796 & n.109 (citing Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6
B.T.A. 1023, 1025 (1927), acq. VII- C.B. 14 (1928)); see also Paul C. Feinberg, Federal
Income Taxation of Punitive Damages Awarded in Personal Injury Actions, 42 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 339, 370-71 (1992).
15. See Henning, supra note 5, at 784-85 & n.12 (citing Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92
(1922)).
16. See Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927), acq. VII-I C.B. 14 (1928).
17. See Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32 (1972); see also Henning, supra note 5, at 785
& n.13.
18. See Henning, supra note 5, at 785 & n.13.
19. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47, revoked by Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
20. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, revk'g Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
21. A "Revenue Ruling" is the IRS interpretation of a section of the Internal Revenue
Code. See Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Commissioner, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1302-03
(D.D.C. 1973) (stating an IRS interpretation of a statute is limited in future weight and
authority). Usually, the IRS will base its interpretation on facts given in one or more
hypotheticals. Id. at 1302 n.15. Revenue Rulings are not controlling and hold only persua-
sive value. Id. at 1306. Moreover, the persuasiveness of the Revenue Ruling is limited in
applicability to the facts in the stated hypothetical. Id. at 1302 & n.15.
22. See Egleston; supra note 10, at 121.
23. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
24. ld. at 427; see Palmer, supra note 13, at 124-25.
25. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 432-33.
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spond[ed] to a return of [the injured's] capital. '26 Under this reason-
ing, punitive damages were required to be included in gross income
because punitive damages did not restore the plaintiff's loss of capi-
tal.27 Rather, as the Court stated, punitive damages represent the
"amount extracted as punishment" for the defendant's wrongdoing.'
Thus, in the years following Glenshaw Glass, the question arose
whether punitive damages awarded in personal injury cases were le-
gally excludable from gross income under section 104(a)(2).
C. Revenue Ruling 75-45
By issuing Revenue Ruling 75-45, the IRS attempted to assert its
position on whether the punitive-compensatory distinction elicited in
Glenshaw Glass should also apply to section 104(a)(2).29 In Revenue
Ruling 75-45, which interpreted the language of section 104(a)(2),10
the IRS stated that "the amount of any damages received (whether by
suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness" is ex-
cludable from gross income.3' Specifically, the Ruling stated that
"any damages" meant that both compensatory and punitive damages
resulting from a personal injury or sickness case were excluded from
gross income.32 By issuing this Ruling, the IRS made very clear that
the punitive-compensatory distinction drawn in Glenshaw Glass did
not apply to recoveries that qualified under section 104(a)(2).
D. Revenue Ruling 84-108
Nine years after issuing Revenue Ruling 75-45, the IRS expressly
revoked that Ruling when the Service issued Revenue Ruling 84-
108.31 In Revenue Ruling 84-108, the IRS focused its analysis of the
tax status of punitive damage awards-included or excluded from
gross income-on whether the state statute under which the award
was granted considered punitive damages to be compensation for the
plaintiff's injury or punishment for the tortfeasor's wrongdoing.3 4
Specifically, Revenue Ruling 84-108 analyzed damage awards re-
ceived in wrongful death actions under two state statutes: first, a Vir-
ginia statute that limited the recovery to the actual loss sustained from
26. Id. at 432 & n.8.
27. Id.
28. Id at 431.
29. See Henning, supra note 5, at 784; see also Palmer, supra note 13, at 124-25.
30. The language of section 104(a)(2) remains virtually the same today as when Reve-
nue Ruling 75-45 was issued. In 1989, however, Congress made an amendment to the
statute which limited the statute's scope. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
31. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
32. Id.
33. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
34. Id.
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the wrongful death, and did not allow for recovery of punitive dam-
ages;35 and second, an Alabama statute that provided exclusively for
the recovery of punitive damages.36 In its final analysis of 84-108, the
IRS stated that only the damages under the Virginia statute, which
called the recovery in a wrongful death action compensatory damages,
were excludable from taxable income under section 104(a)(2).37 Ad-
ditionally, the IRS concluded that the damages recovered under the
Alabama statute were fully taxable because the State of Alabama con-
sidered these recoveries purely punitive and not compensatory. 8
Two years after the publication of 84-108, in Burford v. United
States, a district court in Alabama severely criticized this ruling.3 9 In
contradiction to Revenue Ruling 84-108, the Burford court held that
damages received under the Alabama wrongful death statute were ex-
cludable from gross income.40 Five years after the IRS issued Reve-
nue Ruling 84-108, Congress passed an amendment to section
104(a)(2).41
35. ld. (citing Wilson v. Whittaker, 154 S.E.2d 124 (Va. 1967)).
36. Id. (citing Alabama Power Co. v. Irwin, 72 So. 2d 300 (Ala. 1954)).
37. Id. Under this reasoning, it would appear that a recovery might be inflated to
include "compensatory" damages that were in fact partially "punitive" to retain the neces-
sary character to be excluded from taxes under section 104(a)(2). For the possible impact
on the size of a damage award when the jury has knowledge that the award will be taxed,
see Edward Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax and Nontax Policy Considerations, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 701, 719-22 (1977) (arguing a jury's awareness of the taxability of a
damage award will cause it to make the award higher to make the victim "whole" again).
Contra infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (noting a federal district court's conclusion
that exclusion of an award under section 104(a)(2) should be based on the underlying ac-
tion, and not based upon how a state legislature may label the recovery as "punitive" or
"compensatory").
38. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32. The IRS based its conclusion on Starrels v. Com-
missioner, 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962), affg 35 T.C. 646 (1961), which held that punitive
damages were not excluded from income under section 104(a)(2) because punitive dam-
ages were awarded based on a defendant's degree of fault, and not for recovery of a loss of
human capital. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
39. Specifically, the court argued against the revenue ruling by holding that recovery
of damages for a wrongful death is directly related to a personal injury-the fatal injury of
the deceased-and the plain language of section 104(a)(2) allows for exclusion of any dam-
ages. 642 F. Supp. 635, 637-38 & n.5 (N.D. Ala. 1986); see also Craig Day, Taxation of
Punitive Damages: Interpreting Section 104(a)(2) After the Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1989, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1023 (1991) (summarizing the Burford court's criticism of
Revenue Ruling 84-108).
40. Burford, 642 F. Supp. at 638.
41. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(a), 103
Stat. 2106, 2379 (1989) (codified at I.R.C. § 104(a)).
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E. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989
In 1989, in an apparent attempt to clarify 2 the scope of section
104(a)(2), Congress amended the statute.43 The statute now states
that paragraph (a)(2) "shall not apply to any punitive damages in con-
nection with a case not involving physical injury or physical sick-
ness." 44  Under this amendment, punitive damages awarded in
nonphysical injury or sickness cases clearly fall outside the scope of
section 104(a)(2) and therefore are not eligible for exclusion from
gross income.45 Thus, it would seem that punitive damages awarded
in physical injury cases were not impacted by this amendment and
therefore, should continue to maintain their "excluded from gross in-
come" status held prior to the amendment.46 However, several recent
court decisions have reached different conclusions on whether puni-
tive damages awarded in cases "involving physical injury or physical
sickness '47 are currently excludable from gross income under section
104(a)(2).48
In light of the history of section 104(a)(2), including the ever-
changing IRS position as reflected in its Revenue Rulings and the
1989 congressional amendment to the statute, the courts have dili-
gently assumed the responsibility of determining the final meaning of
section 104(a)(2) regarding the taxation of punitive damages in physi-
cal injury and sickness cases.
42. However, as this Note will show, apparent congressional attempt to clarify section
104 resulted in only more confusion, especially with respect to punitive damages. See infra
notes 72-77, 128-130 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 5.
44. .R.C. § 104 (1994) (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that this is the first
and only mention of "punitive damages" in section 104. Specifically, the amendment
changed the statute to state now that punitive damages in nonphysical injury and nonphysi-
cal sickness cases are not excludable from gross income under section 104(a)(2). The
amendment did not expressly mention the impact, if any, on punitive damages in physical
injury and physical sickness cases.
Before the amendment, punitive damages in all personal injury, tort-type claims were
excludable from gross income under the statute. See Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625,
629 (6th Cir. 1994) (relying on United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229,237 (1992)). Nonethe-
less, in light of this 1989 amendment, some courts have held that exclusion under section
104 should apply only to compensatory damages because that section is entitled "Compen-
sation for injuries or sickness." See Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1083-84 (9th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995); Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228, 231
(Fed. Cir. 1994); see also infra notes 79-84. If Congress intended to allow only the exclu-
sion of compensatory damages under section 104, then there was no reason to include the
last clause of the amendment. That is, the amendment would have stated that "paragraph
104(a)(2) shall not apply to any punitive damages," and Congress would have eliminated
the phrase "in connection with a case not involving physical injury or sickness."
45. See Egleston, supra note 10, at 127 & n.79.
46. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 237 (1992).
47. I.R.C. § 104 (1994).
48. See, e.g., Horton, 33 F.3d at 630; Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1078.
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H. Two Methods of Interpreting Section 104(a)(2)
Within the last year, several circuits have attempted to interpret
the scope of section 104(a)(2). 49 Generally, these courts have em-
ployed two methods in analyzing the meaning of section 104(a)(2) and
have reached different conclusions on the excludability of punitive
damages awarded in physical injury or physical sickness cases under
section 104(a)(2).5° One method of interpreting section 104(a)(2), as
illustrated by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hawkins v. United States,
focuses on analyzing the sparse legislative history51 and purpose for
awarding punitive damages, resulting in a determination that no puni-
tive damage award (regardless of the type of underlying case) is ex-
cludable from gross income under section 104.52 The other approach,
which is represented by the Sixth Circuit's decision in Horton v. Com-
missioner, relies on case law interpreting the pre-1989 section
104(a)(2) and on the plain language of the statute.53 This second
method finds that punitive damages in cases of physical injury or per-
sonal sickness cases are excludable from gross income under section
104(a)(2).54
A. The Ninth Circuit Approach in Hawkins v. United States
A recent Ninth Circuit decision, Hawkins v. United States,5 inter-
49. See, e.g., Wesson v. United States, 48 F.3d 894 (5th Cir. 1995); Schmitz v. Commis-
sioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994); Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994);
Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
50. See supra note 6.
51. A brief summary of the legislative history provides:
The House Ways and Means Committee Report and House bill made no mention
of the tax treatment of punitive damages. The Senate version of the budget bill
contained no provisions amending or limiting section 104(a)(2). The conference
committee, however, agreed to end the tax-free treatment of punitive damage
recoveries when physical injury or sickness is not involved, but declined to re-
quire physical injuries or sickness in order for nonpunitive damage recoveries to
be excludable.
Henning, supra note 5, at 800; see id. at 800 & nn.138-41.
52. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1080-84; see, eg., Wesson v. United States, 48 F.3d 894 (5th
Cir. 1995).
53. Horton, 33 F.3d at 629-31. According to Nalle v. Commissioner, 997 F.2d 1134,
1139 (5th Cir. 1993), "it is a tenet of statutory construction that every word must be given
meaning." Under the plain language approach, the statement in section 104(2)(a) that
"any damages received" are excludable must mean any damages and not some damages.
See Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1084 (Trott, J., dissenting).
54. See Horton, 33 F.3d at 630.
55. 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995). In denying review
in Hawkins on June 19, 1995, the Court may have believed this issue was decided by its
June 14, 1995 opinion in Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995) (6-3). The issue
in Schleier, however, was whether liquidated damages awarded in an age discrimination
suit were excludable under section 104(a)(2). In reversing the IRS position of the past 35
years that these damages were excludable from gross income, see id. at 2171 (O'Connor, J.,
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preted section 104(a)(2) to mean that any punitive damage recovery is
taxable and thus not excludable from gross income.5 6 In Hawkins, the
Ninth Circuit based its decision on the return of lost-human-capital
theory.7 That is, only the costs associated with making the taxpayer
"whole" should be excluded under section 104(a)(2).5 8  Because
"purely punitive awards... 'are not intended to compensate the in-
jured party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action
was intentional or malicious, and to deter him and others from similar
extreme conduct,"' 59 the Ninth Circuit concluded that any punitive
dissenting), the Court held in Schleier that liquidated damages were not received "on ac-
count of personal injuries or sickness." Id. at 2164. The Court in dicta stated that pain and
suffering recoveries are excludable under 104(a)(2), but punitive damages, which include
liquidated damages, are not. Id. To determine whether a recovery may be excluded under
section 104(a)(2), the Court "created" a two-part test that, in fact, relied on the test in its
earlier decision in United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992): "First, the taxpayer must
demonstrate that the underlying cause of action ... is 'based upon tort or tort type rights';
and second, the taxpayer must show that the damages were received 'on account of per-
sonal injuries of sickness."' Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167 (quoting Burke, 504 U.S. at 234).
This was similar to the test used by the court in Horton, in which the Sixth Circuit deter-
mined punitive damages awarded in a personal injury case satisfied this two-part test and
thus were excludable from gross income. Horton, 33 F.3d at 630-31.
56. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1081, 1084. But cf. Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th
Cir. 1994) (same two judges who constituted the majority in Hawkins joined the dissenter
in Hawkins in holding punitive damage payments made in settlement of a suit under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) are excludable under section 104(a)(2)).
Schmitz was decided six weeks after Hawkins. In Schmitz, the Ninth Circuit tried to
square its decision with its opinion in Hawkins by allegedly applying the same two-part test
it applied in Hawkins. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 792. The taxpayer "must show both (1) that the
underlying cause of action was tort-like ... and (2) that the damages were received 'on
account of' the taxpayer's personal injury." Id (citations omitted). Judge Trott, the dis-
senter in Hawkins, pointed out in his concurrence, however, that the ADEA liquidated
damages awarded to Schmitz, like punitive damages, "are intended to punish and deter"
the tortfeasor. l at 798 (Trott, J., concurring). Therefore, "[b]ased on [the majority's
decision in] Hawkins, ADEA liquidated damages should be taxable." ld. at 799.
Additionally, agreeing with the Ninth Circuit, Justice O'Connor in her dissent in
Schleier stated that ADEA liquidated damages should be excluded from gross income
under 104(a)(2) since liquidated damages "are tort like because they 'compensate victims
for damages which are too obscure and difficult to prove."' Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2169
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
57. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1083-84. In explaining its decision, the court stated, "we find
that the exemption [under section 104(a)(2)] does not apply to punitive damages which
bear no relationship to actual injuries, do not even purport to compensate the victim for
actual losses, and cannot rationally be characterized as anything but a windfall." Id at
1084; see also supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
58. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1083. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit relied on its earlier deci-
sion, made before Revenue Ruling 75-45, in Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576
(9th Cir. 1962). Starrels, however, did not involve punitive damages, and thus the com-
ments by the Ninth Circuit in 1962 were dicta. See Palmer, supra note 13, at 125.
59. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1083 (quoting City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
247, 266 (1981)).
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damage award is taxable 60  and not excludable under section
104(a)(2).6"
In Hawkins, the taxpayers crashed their automobile62 and sought
reimbursement from their insurance carrier, Allstate.63 After Allstate
pressured the Hawkinses into purchasing an inferior car as a replace-
ment for their totalled car,64 the Hawkinses sued Allstate for breach
of good faith and fair dealing.65 The Hawkinses received a compensa-
tory award of $15,000 and a punitive award of $3.5 million.66
In 1988,67 when the Hawkinses filed their income taxes reflecting
these awards, they reported the punitive award as gross income68 be-
cause they did not believe punitive damages were excludable from
gross income under section 104(a)(2).69 Later, the Hawkinses filed an
amended return based on their new belief that punitive damages
based on personal injury were excludable under section 104(a)(2).70
In their amended return, the Hawkinses requested a refund of
$793,277.71 The Hawkinses based their new understanding of section
60. In reaching its holding, the Ninth Circuit overruled the district court's opinion that
the Hawkinses punitive damages were excludable under section 104(a)(2). Id. at 1080; see
Hawkins v. Allstate, 733 P.2d 1073 (Ariz. 1987); cf. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 795-96 (holding
ADEA liquidated damages are excludable under section 104(a)(2) because those damage
awards serve a compensatory purpose, and thus are not punitive); supra note 56.
61. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1084. But cf. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 796 (stating that "[l]iquidated
damages are traditionally compensatory; punitive damages are not").
62. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1078.
63. I at 1079.
64. The value of the Hawkinses' original car, prior to being totalled was $8000. 1& at
1078. Allstate convinced the Hawkinses to settle for a car worth only $6,741. Further-
more, Allstate did not outfit the new car with certain options as Allstate had agreed. Id. at
1079.
65. Without providing more facts, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Hawkinses "suf-
fered 'personal injuries' as a result of Allstate's conduct." Id at 1079. The court implied
that the Hawkinses suffered mental distress due to Allstate's actions, and these injuries
qualify as "personal injuries" for purposes of section 104. Id. (citing Bates v. Superior
Court, 749 P.2d 1367, 1370 (Ariz. 1988)).
66. Id at 1079.
67. It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit recognized the 1989 amendment to sec-
tion 104(a)(2), but that change did not impact this case because the Hawkinses received
their damage awards in 1988. See supra notes 5, 42-48 and accompanying text. However,
because the Hawkinses relied on the 1989 change to the statute in arguing that the congres-
sional intent was only to tax punitive damages in nonphysical injury and sickness cases, the
court analyzed the current meaning of the statute. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1082. Ultimately,
the Ninth Circuit rejected the Hawkinses' assertion. Id.
68. The actual amount reported as gross income was $2,937,406, which equals the $3.5
million punitive award less expenses, attorney fees, and costs. Id. at 1079.
69. Id
70. Id
71. Id. A limited survey of cases involving taxpayers who paid taxes and then asked in
amended returns for refunds indicates that taxpayers are not likely to prevail on their
claim. In 1992, the IRS kept $276 million-approximately 63% of all previously paid
104(a)(2) on the 1989 change to the statute.72 Specifically, they ar-
gued that this amendment expressly stated that punitive damages re-
covered after July 10, 1989 from nonpersonal injury cases were not
excludable under section 104(a)(2).71 By implication, the Hawkinses
argued that before July 10, 1989, punitive damages from nonpersonal
injury cases and personal injury cases were excluded.74 Thus, the 1989
amendment impacted only one class of punitive damages-those
awarded in nonphysical injury or nonphysical sickness cases.
The Ninth Circuit did not agree.75 The court stated that "Con-
gress may amend a statute simply to clarify existing law, to correct a
misinterpretation, or to overrule wrongly decided cases." 76 Thus, the
court found that the Hawkinses incorrectly interpreted the congres-
sional purpose for enacting the 1989 amendment, and incorrectly con-
cluded that punitive damages in personal injury cases are excludable
from gross income.77
taxes-in the lawsuits in claims court or district court. DEP'T OF TREASURY, IRS ANN.
REP. 50 (1992). Interestingly, the taxpayer lost 85% of all Tax Court cases in 1992. Id.
However, these Tax Court results do not hold true on whether punitive damage
awards in physical injury cases are excludable from gross income. Generally, the Tax
Court has ruled in favor of the taxpayer in holding that punitive damages in physical injury
cases are excludable under section 104. E.g., Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93 (1993)
(16-3); Commissioner v. Miller, 93 T.C. 330 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990); see
also Robert A. Clifford, Courts, IRS Disagree on Whether Punitive Damages Taxable, CHi-
CAGO LAW., March 1995, at 13 (referring to the disparate court opinions on the issue of
taxation of punitive damages under section 104(a)(2)). Mr. Clifford suggests that the court
(federal district court or Tax Court) that decides the case is the determinative factor of
success:
This split has created an anomalous situation for personal injury claimants: Those
who report the damages as income, pay the tax, and then seek a refund must do
so through federal court, where the taxpayer generally loses. However, if instead
the taxpayer decides not to report the punitive damages as income, he is likely to
face a claim brought by the IRS and wind up in Tax Court. In Horton, the tax-
payer fared better fin the Tax Court] because the IRS position was rejected and
the income was held not taxable.
Id.
72. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1082.
73. I.
74, Id.
75, Id.
76. Id. However, all three of the court's stated purposes for amending a statute fall
into the court's first stated category: clarification. That is, both correcting a misinterpreta-
tion of a statute and overruling a court decision that incorrectly interpreted the statute
involve clarifying the statute's meaning so that a proper interpretation of the law can be
made.
77. Id. If the congressional intent in the 1989 amendment was to make all punitive
damages taxable, as is suggested by the Ninth Circuit, then it would have expressly stated
so. This 1989 amendment was the first time that Congress used the word "punitive" in the
statute. See supra note 44.
It appears that the Ninth Circuit is imploring Congress to clarify this issue. Because of
the unpopularity of raising taxes among constituents, however, this congressional silence
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After rejecting these arguments, the Ninth Circuit looked at the
legislative history of the 1989 amendment to section 104(a)(2). 8 Prior
to 1989, a majority, if not all, of courts held that section 104(a)(2)
allowed for the exclusion of punitive damages in a variety of cases.79
These cases included punitive damages awarded in employment dis-
crimination and injury to reputation suits.80 The court recognized that
the legislative history indicated that "Congress was not concerned
with punitive damages, but with nonphysical injury cases." 8' Origi-
nally, the House wanted all recoveries received on account of non-
physical injuries to be completely taxable, and thus not covered under
section 104(a)(2).82 The Senate, however, refused to pass this ver-
sion.83 In conference, the House and Senate agreed to a compromised
amendment to section 104(a)(2) that withdrew only punitive damages
recovered in nonphysical injury cases from the exclusion under section104(a)(2).84 .
After the Ninth Circuit reviewed the legislative history of the
statute and determined that it lacked sufficient clarity to decide the
issue of the taxability of punitive damages in physical injury cases, the
court focused on the policy concerns for not including these punitive
damage awards under section 104(a)(2). s5 In its analysis, the court
relied on its earlier opinion in Starrels v. Commissioner.6 Specifically,
the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its finding in Starrels and stated that dam-
ages recovered from personal injury actions may be excluded from
gross income only to the extent that the damages "restore a loss to
capital. '8 7 The court further held that the purpose of awarding puni-
may signal an actual desire for the courts to interpret the statute as did the Ninth Circuit in
Hawkins to raise critically needed revenue.
78. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1082 n.6.
79. Id. at 1082 (citing Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983) and
Commissioner v. Miller, 93 T.C. 330 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990)); see Hor-
ton, 33 F.3d at 631 n.12 (refuting the Ninth Circuit's majority decision in Hawkins).
80. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1082 (citing Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81, 83-84
(6th Cir. 1988), Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983), and Commis-
sioner v. Miller, 93 T.C. 330 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990)).
81. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1082 n.6. With this admission, it is difficult to ascertain how
the Ninth Circuit came to the conclusion that it ultimately reached. That is, if before the
1989 amendment, punitive damages in both physical and nonphysical injury cases were
excluded from gross income under section 104, and the court admitted that the 1989
change focused on recoveries received in nonphysical injury cases, then the 1989 change
should not impact punitive damage recoveries in physical injury cases.
82. Id. (citing H.R. RE. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1354-55 (1989), reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2824-25).
83. Id. (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 623 (1989), reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 3225-26).
84. See id.
85. Id. at 1083.
86. 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962).
87. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1083 (citing Starrels, 304 F.2d at 576).
tive damages was not to restore a plaintiff's loss of human capital, but
rather to serve as a means of punishment to the tortfeasor for
wrongdoing.88
When applying this rationale in the Hawkins case, the court held
that the compensatory award was the only amount eligible for exclu-
sion under 104(a)(2) because that amount was directly related to re-
storing the Hawkinses' loss of capital.89 However, the $3.5 million
punitive award was not compensation for restoring any loss of capital
sustained by the Hawkinses.90 Rather, as the court described, receiv-
ing a punitive award is akin to winning the "litigation lottery." 91 Spe-
cifically, the punitive award was granted solely to punish Allstate for
its alleged bad faith.92 Because the punitive award was granted not to
compensate the Hawkinses for their injuries, but to punish Allstate for
its tortious conduct, the Hawkinses were not allowed to exclude the
punitive damages from their gross income under section 104(a)(2). 93
88. Id.
89. Id
90. Id.
91. Id at 1084. An analysis of the taxation of a punitive award under the Hawkins
approach, however, provides a different conclusion. Under the Hawkins holding, the real
winner in the "litigation lottery" is the government. 'Iwo examples, one when the govern-
ment is the losing party, and the other when a private individual or company is the losing
party, will demonstrate the impact of the taxation of punitive damages. For simplicity pur-
poses, assume a 40% tax rate, 30% attorney's fee, and 20% deductible litigation expenses.
First scenario: Government as the tortfeasor.
When the federal government is found guilty of tortious conduct, the government ef-
fectively only has to pay 68% of the judgment. The federal government will pay 100% of
the judgment, but will receive 32% of the judgment back when the taxpayer and her attor-
ney pay taxes (see below), resulting in only 68% outlay of funds by the government.
The successful claimant will ultimately recover only 30% percent of the award. The
claimant will receive 100% of the judgment and will be able to deduct 20% for expenses
and 30% for attorney fees. Then, the taxpayer will be taxed on the remaining 50%, result-
ing in a tax bill of 20% of the actual judgment. Thus, the taxpayer will receive only 30% of
the judgment.
The attorney will be taxed on his or her 30% as ordinary income, resulting in approxi-
mately 12% of the judgment, thus receiving 18% of the punitive damage award.
In the final analysis, the government will receive approximately 32% of the judgment
in taxes: 20% from the claimant and 12% from the attorney. Thus, the approximate per-
centage distribution of the judgment after taxes would be: 32% to the government, 30% to
the plaintiff, 18% to the plaintiff's attorney, and 20% for expenses.
Second scenario: Private individual as the tortfeasor.
Unlike the situation where the government is the tortfeasor and receives a set-off of
the actual judgment from the taxes paid by the winning party and her attorney, the private
company or individual as tortfeasor must pay 100% of the punitive damage judgment.
Nevertheless, the government will still benefit by receiving 32% of the judgment through
taxes from the successful claimant and her attorney (see above scenario). Therefore, by
receiving 32% of the judgment, the government gains an unearned windfall.
92. Id. at 1083.
93. Id.
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Thus, under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, punitive damage awards
are not excludable from gross income under section 104(a)(2) because
these damages neither relate to restoring nor provide compensation
for a party's loss of capital, but rather punish the tortfeasor for
wrongdoing.
B. The Sixth Circuit Approach in Horton v. Commissioner
One month after the Ninth Circuit decided Hawkins, the Sixth
Circuit decided the same issue in Horton v. Commissioner.94 The
Sixth Circuit, however, expressly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in Hawkins.95 In Horton, the Sixth Circuit held that the
plain language of section 104(a)(2) allows for the exclusion of punitive
damages if those damages meet the test adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Burke.96 Under the Burke test, the
underlying injury must be personal and result from a tort-type claim.97
Burke, however, did not consider the effect of the 1989 amendment to
section 104(a)(2). Thus, in Horton, the Sixth Circuit held that only
damages that meet the Burke test, and are received due to physical
injuries or physical sickness, may be excluded from gross income.98
In Horton, the plaintiffs were injured when their house exploded
because of a gas leak that the defendant power company failed to de-
tect.99 The jury awarded the Hortons $103,552 in compensatory dam-
ages' 00 and $500,000 in punitive damages. 101 Relying on section
104(a)(2), the Hortons excluded the $500,000 punitive damage recov-
ery from gross income when reporting their 1985 federal income
tax.10 2 In response, the IRS sent the Hortons a notice of deficiency,
94. 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994).
95. Id at 630 n.9. Interestingly, one day after Horton was decided, the Ninth Circuit
decided Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994). See supra note 56. The
Ninth Circuit's decision in Schmitz, unlike its decision in Hawkins, reached a result fairly
similar to the court in Horton in finding that punitive damages received from personal
injury claims are excluded from gross income under section 104(a)(2). Schmitz, 34 F.3d at
797 (Trott, J., concurring).
96. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992), cited in Horton, 33 F.3d at 630-31.
97. Horton, 33 F.3d at 631 (citing Burke, 504 U.S. at 237).
98. Id
99. Id. at 626. The decision does not describe the extent of the Hortons' injuries. The
court, however, did state that the Hortons recovered damages on an underlying claim of
personal, physical injuries. Id. at 631.
100. The jury awarded $62,265 in compensatory damages to Mr. Horton and $41,287 in
compensatory damages to Mrs. Horton. Id.
101. The jury awarded Mr. Horton $100,000 in punitive damages and Mrs. Horton
$400,000 in punitive damages. Id.
102. Id. Although the taxpayers' reported income tax was for the year 1985, the tax-
payers cited the 1989 amendment as support for their conclusion that section 104(a)(2)
allows for exclusion from gross income of punitive damage awards in physical injury cases.
Id. at 627.
claiming that the punitive damage recovery was not excludable from
gross income under section 104(a)(2). 1°3
After the Tax Court decided in favor of the Hortons,1 4 the Com-
missioner appealed to the Sixth Circuit.10 5 Although the issue decided
by the Sixth Circuit centered on whether punitive damages awarded
on account of personal injuries are excludable from income under the
pre-1989 section 104(a)(2), 0 6 the Sixth Circuit's analysis is significant
because the court analyzed the impact of the 1989 amendment on the
current ability to exclude punitive damage recoveries under section
104(a)(2). °7
Upon recognizing that there was no consensus within the federal
judiciary on the issue of excluding a punitive damage recovery in per-
sonal injury cases from gross income,108 the Sixth Circuit in Horton
carefully evaluated each of the Commissioner's arguments. 0 9 The
court also analyzed several recent decisions on the issue" 0 before ulti-
mately rejecting each of the Commissioner's assertions."' First, the
Sixth Circuit rejected the opinion of the Ninth Circuit in Hawkins that
found that the underlying purpose of section 104(a)(2) was to exclude
only those damages, such as compensatory damages,"' which make a
taxpayer "whole.""' 3 The Sixth Circuit stated that "a plaintiff in a per-
sonal injury suit who is permanently maimed is really never 'made
whole' by compensatory money damages.""' Second, the Commis-
sioner argued that punitive damages, as opposed to compensatory
damages, are not received "on account" of a personal injury, and thus
should not be excludable under section 104(a)(2)." 5 The Sixth Circuit
103. Id. at 626.
104. Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93 (1993). In the Tax Court decision, sixteen
judges concurred and only three dissented in the conclusion that punitive damage awards
received on account of personal injuries are excludable from gross income under section
104(a)(2). Idt
105. Horton, 33 F.3d at 625.
106. ld. at 626.
107. Id. at 631 ("[O]ur holding is consistent with [the 1989 revision to] section 104(a)(2)
. which in effect allows punitive damages awarded in personal injury cases to be excluded
from gross income.").
108. Id. at 627 (citing Estate of Wesson v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (S.D.
Miss. 1994)).
109. Horton, 33 F.3d at 626-32.
110. Id. at 628-29 (analyzing Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994), Com-
missioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990) and Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d
1077 (9th Cir. 1994)).
111. Id at 630.
112. See Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2576 (1995).
113. Horton, 33 F.3d at 627, 632.
114. Id. at 632.
115. Id at 626.
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rejected this argument and stated that section 104 did not distinguish
between punitive damages and compensatory damages received "on
account" of a personal injury. 116 Furthermore, the court stated that
punitive damages are "inextricably bound up" with the underlying
tort-type claim,"17 and it is therefore "logical to conclude that punitive
damages are received 'on account' of [personal injury claims].""'
Third, the Commissioner urged the court to follow the Federal Cir-
cuit's decision in Reese v. United States,119 the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Commissioner v. Miller,120 and the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Hawkins'21-all of which held that punitive damages should be in-
cluded in gross income. The Sixth Circuit distinguished each of these
cases by stating that either the statute at issue in the case provided or
the plaintiff expressly agreed 22 that the punitive damage recovery did
not serve any compensatory purpose.
23
In reaching its decision the Horton court adopted the test from
United States v. Burke. 24 Specifically, the injury must be personal and
116. Id. at 631; see supra note 44.
117. Horton, 33 F.3d at 630 (quoting Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93, 99 (1993)).
118. Id. (quoting Horton, 100 T.C. at 99).
119. 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
120. 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
121. 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995); see supra notes 55-
93.
122. Reliance on a plaintiff's statement such as the Hawkinses' is tenuous at best. The
Hawkinses stated that their compensatory recovery included all damages, including those
for emotional distress. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1080. If they had stated that the award of
punitive damages included compensation for emotional distress, then under the Sixth Cir-
cuit's analysis, the Hawkinses would be able to exclude punitive damages from their gross
income under section 104(a)(2). The Sixth Circuit's decision in Horton will encourage a
plaintiff to state that the punitive damage award is partially, if not fully, "compensatory."
123. Horton, 33 F.3d at 632.
124. 504 U.S. 229 (1992). In Burke, the Supreme Court decided that backpay awards
received in settlement of Title VII claims are not excludable from gross income under
section 104(a)(2) because the recoveries are not from an underlying tort-type claim. Id. at
241.
Although the Supreme Court in Burke overruled the Sixth Circuit's lower court deci-
sion in that case, the Supreme Court expressly approved of the Sixth Circuit's framework
for determining what damages are excludable under section 104(a)(2). Id. at 237 (citing
United States v. Burke, 929 F.2d 1119, 1121 (6th Cir. 1991)). The Sixth Circuit's frame-
work stated:
that for the purposes of section 104(a)(2).... [the inquiry is] whether the injury is
personal and the claim resulting in damages is tort-like in nature. If the answer is
in the affirmative, then that is "the beginning and end of the inquiry." The dam-
ages resulting from such a claim are fully excludable under section 104(a)(2). At
no point do we inquire into the nature of the damages involved. Rather the nar-
row scope of our gaze is properly limited to the "origin and character of the claim,
•.. and not to the consequences that result from the injury."
Burke, 929 F.2d at 1123 (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
result from a tort-like claim. 125 In Burke, the Supreme Court stated
that the focus of the inquiry under section 104 should be on the type
of underlying claim (tort-like or not) and not on the nature of the
damages received. 2 6 To further support this argument, the Sixth Cir-
cuit in Horton expressly found that "the plain meaning of the broad
statutory language [of section 104(a)(2)] simply does not permit a dis-
tinction between punitive and compensatory damages."' 27
Because the test in Burke did not take into full consideration the
1989 amendment to section 104(a)(2), the Sixth Circuit in Horton ana-
lyzed that amendment:1'
Since punitive damages in a case not involving physical injury or
sickness are singled out as being includable in gross income, the
clear implication of Congress's phraseology is that punitive
damages in a case involving physical injury or physical sickness
are excludable and were excludable even before the
amendment.129
Thus, the Sixth Circuit relied on the plain meaning of the statute to
conclude that punitive damages in physical injury cases remain exclud-
able from gross income under section 104(a)(2). °
In sum, the Sixth Circuit in Horton analyzed: first, whether the
recovery was "on account of a personal injury";' 3' second, whether
the underlying claim was tort-like; 32 and third, whether the plain lan-
guage of the statute allowed for the exclusion of any recovery result-
125. Burke, 504 U.S. at 237.
126. I (citing Burke, 929 F.2d at 1121).
127. Horton, 33 F.3d at 631 (quoting Commissioner v. Miller, 93 T.C. 330, 338 (1989)).
The Sixth Circuit expressly agreed with Judge Trott's "cogent reasoning" in his dissent in
Hawkins, which stated that "the Tax Court's conclusion that the language of [section
104(a)(2)] was unambiguous, permitting no distinction between compensatory and punitive
damages is a sound construction of the statute." Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1084 (Trott, J., dis-
senting), cited in Horton, 33 F.3d at 631 n.9.
128. The 1989 amendment stated that "[p]aragraph 2 shall not apply to any punitive
damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness." Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 7641(a); see supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
129. Horton, 33 F.3d at 631 n.12.
130. As the Horton court pointed out, this conclusion is supported by the Supreme
Court's comment in Burke that "[in 1989] Congress amended section 104(a) to allow the
exclusion of punitive damages only in cases involving 'physical injury or physical sick-
ness."' Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1871 n.6, cited in Horton, 33 F.3d at 631. That is, the distinction
that Congress intended to make with the 1989 amendment to section 104 was whether the
underlying injury was physical or nonphysical. If the underlying personal injury was non-
physical, then punitive damages based on that injury would not be excludable from gross
income under the amended section 104. The amendment, however, did not change the
ability to exclude punitive damages for personal, physical injuries. Thus, punitive damages
recovered from an underlying personal, physical injury would continue to be excluded
under section 104 if the underlying injury passed the two-part Burke test.
131. See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 124, 126 and accompanying text.
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ing from a personal injury in an underlying tort-type claim. 3 3 Under
this analytical framework, the court held that the Hortons's punitive
damages, received on account of a personal injury from the defend-
ant's gross negligence, were excludable under section 104(a)(2). 34
H1. Inconsistent Decisions Result in Unequal Treatment of
United States Taxpayers
As both Hawkins and Horton illustrate, different circuit interpre-
tations result in different taxation of United States taxpayers. For ex-
ample, under the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hawkins, a taxpayer who
receives punitive and compensatory damages resulting from a per-
sonal, physical injury claim will not be able to exclude the punitive
damages under section 104(a)(2), and thus will be fully taxed on the
punitive damage award, resulting in a tax of approximately 39.6% of
the punitive recovery. 135 If this same taxpayer, however, was fortu-
nate enough to live within the jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit,'136 or
within the jurisdiction of courts with similar decisions,137 the taxpayer
would be able to exclude this punitive damage recovery, essentially
retaining 39.6% more of the damage recovery than a similarly situated
taxpayer within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.
This Note argues that this unequal tax treatment violates the Uni-
formity Clause of the United States Constitution. 38 The following
section proposes a solution and encourages either the Supreme Court
or Congress to resolve these inconsistent results which have a materi-
ally disparate impact on taxpayers.
A. Background of the Uniformity Clause
After the colonialists won their fight for independence, the Arti-
cles of Confederation, the governing document of the new federal sys-
133. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
134. Horton, 33 F.3d at 631.
135. This is the marginal rate of taxation for married couples filing jointly with income
above $250,000. I.R.C. § 1 (1994). In Hawkins, the taxpayers owed approximately
$800,000 in taxes on a punitive award of $3.5 million. After expenses and attorney fees, the
Hawkinses had approximately $2.9 million of income. The $800,000 tax payment due on
$2.9 million of income resulted in an effective tax rate of approximately 27%. See Haw-
kins, 30 F.3d at 1079-82. Without more information than what is provided in the case, it is
difficult to speculate why the Hawkinses' effective tax rate is not higher.
136. See Horton, 33 F.3d at 630.
137. See, e.g., Brabson v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 1360, 1364 (D. Colo. 1994) (hold-
ing mandatory statutory prejudgment interest awarded in a personal injury action was
compensatory and therefore to be excluded from gross income under section 104(a)(2),
even though the "obligation to pay ... is tied inextricably to the concept of fault").
138. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
tem, did not grant Congress the power to tax.1 39 That power was left
to the states.140 Although the new Congress had the power to govern,
this severe limitation on the power to raise revenues caused the gov-
ernment to flounder.14 1 So, "to form 'a more perfect Union,"' dele-
gates from the several states met in Philadelphia in 1787.142
Under the Constitution of 1787, which replaced the Articles of
Confederation, the first enumerated power granted to Congress was
the power of taxation. 143 Specifically, the Constitution states that
"[t]he Congress shall have Power to Lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises,... but all Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States." 44 Income taxes and other
indirect taxes must be uniform because they are classified as duties,
excises, or imposts. 45 This requirement of uniformity in taxation is
more commonly referred to as the "Uniformity Clause.' 146
On September 12, 1787, five days before the September 17, 1787
ratification of the Constitution, the rule of uniformity stated that taxes
should be "uniform and equal" throughout the United States.' 47 In
the drafting process, however, the language requiring "uniform and
139. See ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781 art. VIII; see also CHARLES ADAMS, FOR
GOOD AND EVIL: THE IMPACr OF TAXES ON THE COURSE OF CIVILIZATION 307 (1993)
(supporting the hypothesis that taxes are a "powerful mover of people" by using an histori-
cal overview).
140. ADAMS, supra note 139, at 307-08.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 309 (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
143. Id at 310.
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
145. See Apache Bend Apartments v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1285, 1295 (N.D. Tex.
1988) (citing Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 15 (1916)). Congressional
authority to collect income taxes is derived expressly from the Sixteenth Amendment to
the Constitution. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XVI; see supra note 1. Section eight, however, im-
poses the requirement that Congress uniformly impose income taxes. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 1.
146. There are two uniformity clauses. See infra note 175. For a brief history of Uni-
formity Clauses, see William L. Matthews, Jr., The Function of Constitutional Provisions
Requiring Uniformity in Taxation, 38 Ky. L. 31, 35-50 (1949) ("Justice Kent mentions
uniformity as an inseparable part of equality .. ") The Supreme Court has held void at
least one law that unequally discriminated on the burden of taxation. See Cumberland
Coal Co. v. Board of Revision of Tax Assessments, 284 U.S. 23, 29 (1931) ("The [Court's]
conclusion is based on the principle that where it is impossible to secure both the standard
of the true value [of property for assessment purposes], and the uniformity and equality
required by law, the latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and ultimate purpose
of the law." (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 446 (1923));
cf. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 82 (1983) ("The one issue that has been raised
repeatedly is whether the requirement of uniformity encompasses some notion of equality.
It was settled fairly early that the Clause does not require Congress to devise a tax that
falls equally or proportionately on each State.").
147. See ADAMS, supra note 139, at 310.
Winter 19961 CONFUSION IN THE COURTS
610 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:591
equal" taxation was deleted."' a Fortunately, before the states passed
the Constitution, James Madison noticed and remedied this omis-
sion. 4 9 Thus, the final understanding of the states in passing the Con-
stitution was that taxes must be imposed "uniformly" throughout the
United States.' 50
The Uniformity Clause was included in the Constitution to "cut
off all undue preferences of one State over another."'' The Framers
did not want Congress to "impose an indirect tax on the inhabitants of
one state which was different than the indirect tax imposed on the
inhabitants of another state."'52 Specifically, they intended to prevent
"oppressive inequalities" of the inhabitants and economy of a state or
region of the country.'5 3 Without the Uniformity Clause, the Framers
feared that the people and economy of one area of the country would
thrive at the expense of another area of the country.' 54 Thus, to limit
the congressional taxing power and ensure uniform imposition of
those powers, the Framers included the rule of uniformity in the
Constitution. 5
B. Cases Interpreting the Uniformity Clause
In one of its early decisions on the meaning of the Uniformity
Clause, the United States Supreme Court in the Head Money Cases
held that a tax is uniform if it "operates with the same force and effect
in every place where the subject of it is found."'5 6 In the Head Money
Cases, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a law that taxed immi-
grants coming into the United States through port cities, but did not
tax immigrants entering the United States through inland cities. 57
The Supreme Court concluded that these tax policies were uniform
because all immigrants coming through port cities were taxed at the
same rate.158
148. Id.
149. Id
150. Id.
151. JOSEPH STOREY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
706 (5th ed. 1891).
152. See Apache Bend Apartments v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1285, 1296 (N.D. Tex.
1988); see also Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 81 ("There was concern that the National Govern-
ment would use its power... to the disadvantage of particular States.").
153. STOREY, supra note 151, at 706.
154. Ld.
155. See Nelson Lund, Comment, The Uniformity Clause, 51 U. CHi. L. Rnv. 1193
(1984) (criticizing the Court's uniformity rulings and arguing the Uniformity Clause should
be read to prefer free markets and unrestrained economic competition as well as to pre-
vent deliberate discrimination by majority factions).
156. 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884); see Lund, supra note 155, at 1195.
157. 112 U.S. at 589-95.
158. Id- at 594.
The Court reaffirmed its holding in the Head Money Cases in
Knowlton v. Moore.'59 In Knowlton, the issue was whether Congress
could classify legacies into categories and tax each category at a pro-
gressive rate, 160 or whether uniformity required that all legacies be
taxed at the same rate.161 The Court held that Congress can classify
taxpayers, and as long as the tax imposed is uniform among that classi-
fication, the statute is constitutional under the Uniformity Clause.' 62
In Ptasynski v. United States, the most recent decision interpret-
ing the meaning of the Uniformity Clause, the Court held that the
Uniformity Clause only requires Congress to impose tax statutes in a
geographically uniform manner. 61 In Ptasynski, the federal statute in
controversy specifically exempted the taxing of oil produced in or
near Alaska.' 64 The issue was whether a tax statute satisfied the re-
quirements of the Uniformity Clause if the classifications in the stat-
ute were based on geography-that is, exempting oil produced in
Alaska.' 65 The Court upheld the statute in what has become a much
criticized decision.' 66 The Court reasoned that the tax was not actu-
ally based on geographic or state lines because the "Alaska oil" ex-
emption also applied to oil produced offshore, which is "beyond the
limits of any State.' 1 67 Relying on its decision in Knowlton, the Court
159. 178 U.S. 41, 106 (1900).
160. The particular statute in Knowlton imposed "a progressive tax on legacies and va-
ried the rate of the tax among classes of legatees." See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S.
74, 82 & n.11 (1983).
161. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 83-84.
162. Id. at 96-106. More recently, the Supreme Court briefly analyzed the Uniformity
Clause. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983). Ptasynski reaffirmed Knowlton's
holding that Congress can enact statutes creating classifications resulting in geographic dis-
crimination, as long as the statute is applied uniformly throughout the United States. Id. at
85-86. Because the issue in Ptasynski was "whether the Uniformity Clause prohibits Con-
gress from defining the class of objects to be taxed in geographic terms," id. at 83, and the
statute at issue in this Note, section 104, does not define the taxpayer class by geography,
Ptasynski is not particularly useful for the purposes of this Note.
163. 462 U.S. 74, 84 (1983).
164. Id, at 75-78.
165. Id. at 78-79.
166. Id. at 85-86. Several commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's ruling in
Ptasynski as completely dismantling the purpose of the Uniformity Clause. See, e.g., Lund,
supra note 155, at 1209 ("the Ptasynski analysis eviscerates the Uniformity Clause"); Philip
J. Deutch, Note, The Uniformity Clause and Puerto Rican Statehood, 43 STAN. L. REv. 685,
706 (1991) ("[Tjhe Ptasynski decision makes it impossible to determine the scope of discre-
tion the Court allows Congress in defining a geographically nonuniform tax."); Lawrence
Zelenak, Are Rifle Shot Transition Rules and Other Ad Hoc Tax Legislation Constitu-
tional?, 44 TAX L. REv. 563, 591 (1989) ("[T]he Ptasynski opinion sends mixed signals.");
Ellen Eggleston, Comment, United States v. Ptasynski: A Windfall for Congress, 61 DENV.
U. L. RFv. 395,405 (1984) ("The Court's treatment [in Ptasynski] ... subverts the purpose
of the uniformity clause.").
167. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 78.
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stated that the tax on oil satisfied the Uniformity Clause because Con-
gress taxed each category of oil uniformly throughout the United
States.68 Moreover, Congress did not "intend to grant Alaska an un-
due preference at the expense of other oil-producing States."'1 69 Thus,
the Court concluded that as long as taxes are imposed uniformly on
taxpayers within nongeographically discriminatory tax classifications,
then the Uniformity Clause is satisfied. 7 °
C. Violation of the Uniformity Clause by Inconsistent Court
Decisions Interpreting I.R.C. Section 104(a)(2)
As the discussion in the previous section demonstrates, a tax stat-
ute is constitutional under the Uniformity Clause if the statute uni-
formly taxes similarly classified taxpayers. The class of taxpayers at
issue under section 104(a)(2) are successful claimants who have re-
ceived punitive damage awards from personal, physical injury cases. 7'
In violation of the Uniformity Clause, circuit courts have reached dif-
fering conclusions on the application of section 104(a)(2) to this class
of taxpayers. 72 For example, the Sixth Circuit has decided that puni-
tive damage awards for this class of taxpayers are excludable from
gross income;173 the Ninth Circuit, however, has contended that these
punitive damage awards are fully taxable, and must be included in
gross income.174 These divergent interpretations of the exclusion of
punitive damage awards in physical injury cases under section
104(a)(2) result in inconsistent, geographically-based taxation of
United States taxpayers. 75
168. Id. at 82, 84.
169. Id. at 86.
170. Id. at 85.
171. See supra notes 4, 5.
172. Because the Uniformity Clause is in Article I of the Constitution, which grants
legislative powers to Congress, it is arguable that only Congress, and not the judiciary, can
violate the Uniformity Clause. However, it would appear that this Clause would be mean-
ingless if the judiciary could circumvent the Framers' purpose for including the Uniformity
Clause by deciding tax lawsuits inconsistently and thus failing to uniformly apply tax stat-
utes. Because the judiciary has the final word on interpreting the Constitution, including
the Uniformity Clause, only the judiciary can determine if its own practice violates the
Clause. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Should the Supreme Court determine that only the Legislature, and not the courts,
can violate the Uniformity Clause, then to preserve the Framers' intent, the judiciary
should consider relinquishing its current responsibility of deciding tax cases. This action
would force Congress to create an appellate form of the Tax Court. In 1969, Congress
formed the Tax Court under its Article I powers. See Gary L. Rodgers, The Commissioner
"Does Not Acquiesce," 59 NEB. L. REv. 1001, 1009 (1980).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 94-134.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 55-93.
175. There is another Uniformity Clause that applies to cases involving bankruptcy.
U.S. CONsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. In Ptasynski v. United States, the Court mentioned that
The inconsistent application of this tax statue violates the Fram-
ers' intent.176 Specifically, the Uniformity Clause was included in the
Constitution to prevent the preferential tax treatment of a state or
region of the country at the expense of another state or region.177
However, this inconsistent approach by different courts of appeals vi-
olates the Uniformity Clause by resulting in geographically disparate
tax treatment of a specific class of taxpayers-those who receive puni-
tive damages on account of personal, physical injuries. For example, a
resident in Arizona will be fully taxed on punitive damages received
on account of a physical injury claim. 178 However, the successful
claimant in Kentucky will be entitled to pocket the full amount (less
expenses and fees) of the punitive award.179 The effect of this practice
is that the Arizona resident's tax payment will supply the federal
treasury with revenues to provide federal services benefitting resi-
dents of all other states, including Kentucky. Conversely, the Ken-
tucky punitive damage award will benefit only the state resident who
is successful on the physical injury claim and the economy where the
award is spent. As illustrated by this example, such disparate tax
treatment violates the Uniformity Clause by voiding the Framers' in-
tent of preventing the inequality that results when some states benefit
from not having to pay certain taxes for which other states are re-
"[a]lthough the purposes giving rise to the Bankruptcy Clause are not identical to those
underlying the Uniformity Clause, we have looked to the interpretation of one Clause in
determining the meaning of the other." 462 U.S. 74, 83 n.13 (1983). Recently, the Ninth
Circuit held that a congressional statute regulating fees paid under a chapter 11 bankruptcy
violated the Uniformity Clause because the statute did not apply uniformly to a defined
class of debtors. Saint Angelo v. Victoria Farms, Inc., 38 F.3d 1525, 1531-32 (9th Cir. 1994).
Under the legislation, Congress granted North Carolina and Alabama an extension in com-
plying with the bankruptcy fee schedule. Because other states were required and had im-
plemented the law, this disparate treatment resulted in a "more costly system" for
resolving bankruptcy disputes in jurisdictions where the law had been implemented. Id at
1532. The court concluded that the statute could not be enforced because, to remain con-
stitutional under the Uniformity Clause, "'a law must at least apply uniformly to a defined
class of debtors."' Md at 1532 (quoting Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455
U.S. 457, 473 (1982)).
The Ninth Circuit decision in Saint Angelo is similar to the argument proposed by this
Note. That is, due to differing appellate court opinions, section 104(a)(2) is not uniformly
applied to a defined class of successful personal injury claimants who receive punitive dam-
age awards. This disparate tax treatment under the statute results in the failure to uni-
formly tax punitive damages as required by the Uniformity Clause.
176. See Apache Bend Apartments v. United States 702 F. Supp. 1285, 1295-96 (N.D.
Tex. 1988).
177. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 80 n.10, 81; see also supra notes 151-155.
178. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating
that the Hawkins case was first decided in Arizona); see also supra notes 55-93 and accom-
panying text.
179. See, e.g., Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625,626 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that the
Hortons resided in Florence, Kentucky); see also supra notes 94-134.
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quired to carry the burden. 80
IV. A Solution to Encourage Equal Application of the Law
To prevent violation of the Uniformity Clause, this Note proposes
a mechanism that, first, allows for dialogue among the circuit courts
on the issue of taxation under section 104 (and other similar tax stat-
utes), second, encourages either Congress or the Supreme Court to
take action to resolve the inconsistent interpretations among the cir-
cuits, and, third, results in a more uniform treatment of taxation
among United States taxpayers in line with the Uniformity Clause.
In the past, several commentators have recognized the failure to
uniformly apply other tax statutes when the Commissioner has ap-
pealed a decision to different circuit courts, resulting in disparate im-
position of taxes.'" A few have argued for the creation of a Tax
Court of Appeals to address the problem of lack of uniformity in cir-
cuit decisions.182 Under this solution, all cases involving disputed tax
issues would be appealed to a court whose decisions would be uni-
formly applied to all taxpayers throughout the United States. This
practice would, among other effects, result in the uniform application
of federal tax laws. Although the Tax Court of Appeals idea has been
advocated by several noteworthy and scholarly individuals, the recom-
mendation has never been implemented. Because this idea has been
repeatedly suggested and never implemented, this Note does not ad-
dress the Tax Court of Appeals alternative.
Rather, this Note proposes a solution to the current problem of
the failure to impose taxes uniformly by providing a rule of proce-
dure' 83 to be followed by courts when deciding tax cases and the IRS
when attempting to enforce those decisions. Specifically, in cases
180. See supra notes 151-155 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 713-18 & nn.175-85 (1989) ("Although the IRS's
practice has been strongly criticized by the [1975 Commission which reviewed and recom-
mended changes for the Federal Court Appellate System] and [by] the secondary litera-
ture, we have not found extensive judicial censure."); Rodgers, supra note 172; Peter K.
Nevitt, Achieving Uniformity Among the 11 Courts of Last Resort, 34 TAXFS 311 (1956).
182. See H. Todd Miller, Comment, A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85 YALE LJ.
228, 228 (1975) (discussing that "our system for the resolution of federal tax controversies
still lacks a unified court to hear tax appeals"); Roger J. Traynor, Administrative and Judi-
cial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes-A Criticism and A Proposal, 38
COLUm. L. REv. 1393 (1938) (noting the ineffectiveness of the current administrative and
judicial procedures for taxes); Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57
HARV. L. REv. 1153 (1944) (suggesting the solution to the inconsistencies in tax decisions
is to create a new tribunal called the Court of Tax Appeals).
183. This rule could be created either by the Supreme Court or Congress. Because the
issue addressed in this Note involves the judiciary's failure to uniformly apply tax laws due
to inconsistent interpretations of tax statutes, the Supreme Court should take responsibility
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where circuits reach conflicting opinions on the meaning of a federal
tax statute, the rule would prevent the enforcement of tax judgments
and allow for the refund of any taxes that have been paid in connec-
tion with the statute. 1' This rule of preventing the imposition of taxes
under an unclear tax statute would remain in effect until either the
Supreme Court or Congress provided a "uniform" meaning of the
statute. Even though this rule would prevent the IRS from collecting
taxes under the statute in conflict, the IRS would still be able to ap-
peal cases that it believes to be incorrectly decided to the different
courts of appeals. These appellate decisions would continue to be a
resource to be used by the Supreme Court should it decide to rectify
the conflict. Essentially, the effect of this rule would be an application
of a tax statute that most favorably benefits the taxpayer until the
Supreme Court or Congress decides differently."8 5
To illustrate how this rule would work, assume three circuit courts
are deciding three separate cases involving the same issue of the
meaning of a particular federal tax statute-whether punitive dam-
ages in personal, physical injury cases are excludable under section
104(a)(2). In chronological order, the First Circuit decides Able, the
Second Circuit decides Bakker, and the Third Circuit decides Carr.
for initiating this rule to prevent the problem created by cases such as the disparate tax
treatment of section 104(a)(2).
A sample draft of this proposed rule is as follows:
(a) Unless there is a conflict among the circuits on the interpretation of a tax
statute, a tax judgment is fully enforceable.
(b) If there is a conflict of decision among the circuits on the interpretation of a
tax statute at the time the taxpayer's case is decided, then the enforceability of the
tax judgment is deferred until clarity is provided by the Supreme Court or
Congress.
(c) If a conflict among the circuits regarding the interpretation of a specific tax
statute arises after the taxpayer's case has been decided, and the taxpayer has
submitted a tax payment, then the taxpayer's payment shall be returned. The
taxpayer shall be required to pay taxes subject to any future clarifications of the
meaning of the statute provided by the Supreme Court or Congress.
184. Although conflicts may arise among the district courts, the taxpayer still may ap-
peal that decision to the circuit court. Because the circuit court decision is the final stage
of due process for most taxpayers-depending on whether the Supreme Court grants certi-
orari-this proposal focuses on the conflict that arises at this stage of the judiciary's deci-
sion process.
185. Cf. Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that exclu-
sions under the I.R.C. are to be narrowly construed); United States v. Centennial Say.
Bank FSB, 499 U.S. 573, 583 (1991) ("Consistent with the rule that tax-exemption[s] ...
are to be construed narrowly. .. ."). Although in light of the current federal fiscal crisis,
the author does not anticipate a welcome reception of this proposal, she encourages honest
consideration of a proposal to solve the failure to impose federal taxes uniformly.
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First Scenario
Suppose the first two circuits both decide that the statute in issue
does not require the taxpayers to pay taxes under the statute. How-
ever, the Third Circuit decides differently and its opinion requires
Carr to pay taxes. Because the conflict among circuits on the meaning
of the tax statute at issue arises with the Carr case, Carr would not be
required to pay any taxes until the Supreme Court or Congress ad-
dresses this issue. In the event that Carr has already paid taxes, she
would be entitled to a refund.
Second Scenario
In this situation, suppose the first two circuits decide that the tax
statute requires the taxpayer to pay taxes. At this point there is not a
conflict, so the first two taxpayers must pay the taxes required under
the statute. However, suppose the conflict among courts arises when
the Third Circuit decides that the meaning of the statute does not re-
quire the taxpayer to pay taxes. In this case, the first two taxpayers
would be allowed a refund and future decisions by circuit courts
would not be able to enforce tax judgments until either the Supreme
Court or Congress provides an interpretation of the statute that allows
for "uniform" taxation under the statute in issue.
Third Scenario
Suppose the First Circuit decides that punitive damages are not
excludable under the tax statute, and in accordance with this decision,
Able pays taxes on his punitive award. The conflict among court deci-
sions arises, however, when the Second Circuit decides that punitive
damages are "clearly" excludable under section 104(a)(2), and thus
Bakker does not pay taxes on her punitive award. At this point, Able
would be entitled to a refund of the taxes he paid on his punitive
award. In addition, suppose that later the Third Circuit decision
aligns with the First Circuit in deciding that punitive damages do not
fall under section 104(a)(2), and are thus taxable. In this case, Carr
would not be required to pay any taxes, although the Third Circuit
decision held the statute required her to pay taxes. These three tax-
payers would not have to pay taxes under the statute and any future
decisions imposing taxes would not be enforceable until the Supreme
Court or Congress decided the statute mandated the payment of
taxes.
In addition to facilitating the uniform application of tax statutes,
the rule proposed by this Note would continue to provide the
Supreme Court a useful resource of varying interpretations of a tax
statute by allowing the circuits to express their differing opinions and
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interpretations of tax statutes. Moreover, if Congress disagrees with
this procedure that effectively favors the taxpayer, it will be en-
couraged to amend the statute to reflect its true intent in enacting the
law.'8 6 This process of delaying the imposition of taxation until
resolving the debate on the meaning of a tax statute will facilitate the
uniform application of tax laws throughout the United States. Fur-
thermore, by uniformly taxing similarly situated taxpayers, the rule
will remove any future violations of the Uniformity Clause. 187
V. Conclusion
Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code has a confusing
and varied legislative and judicial history. Recently, in an attempt to
interpret this statute, two courts of appeals reached strikingly different
conclusions on the meaning of section 104(a)(2). In Hawkins, the
Ninth Circuit relied on the return of lost capital theory, and held that
punitive damages are not compensation for lost human capital under
section 104(a)(2).18 8 The court held that punitive damages received
from physical injury claims are not excludable under section
104(a)(2), and thus such damages are fully taxable for residents within
the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction. 8 9
Just one month later, the Sixth Circuit countered with a com-
pletely different result. In Horton, the court held that punitive dam-
ages received from an underlying claim on account of a physical injury
fall into the exclusion under section 104(a)(2) and thus, are exempt
from taxation for residents within the Sixth Circuit's jurisdiction.190
These conflicting circuit interpretations of section 104(a)(2) vio-
late the Uniformity Clause of the United States Constitution.' 91 To
remedy this violation, the Supreme Court should create a rule that
prevents the enforcement of tax judgments and allows for the refund
of tax payments when circuit courts differ in their interpretation of a
186. Both the dissent and majority in Hawkins asked Congress to "straighten out this
mess." Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1082 n.7, 1087 (Trott, J., dissenting).
187. See supra notes 171-180 and accompanying text. This solution is arguably a more
palatable proposal than the Tax Court of Appeals recommendation, see supra note 182, for
at least two reasons. First, in addition to the benefits mentioned in the text, this solution,
unlike the Tax Court of Appeals solution, does not allow the fox to guard the hen house.
Instead of one Tax Court of Appeals, which would have the sole mission of reviewing tax
cases, and might be encouraged to find tax cases in favor of the IRS, 13 courts of appeals
would have an opportunity of delivering an opinion on an interpretation of a particular tax
statute. Second, this proposal could easily be implemented within the current structure of
the federal court system, and would not require creation of a new court of appeals system
to review tax cases.
188. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1080-81; see supra notes 55-93 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
190. Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1994).
191. See supra notes 171-180 and accompanying text.
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tax statute.192 In addition to enabling circuit courts to continue to de-
cide tax cases, this procedure would also provide the Supreme Court
with different approaches and opinions when making a final determi-
nation of the appropriate meaning and application of a tax statute. 93
Moreover, this rule should encourage Congress to come to a uniform
conclusion on the statute's meaning and to address the pain and suf-
fering among the circuit courts of appeals in interpreting a statute that
lacks legislative history and clear intent.19 4 In any event, Congress
and the Supreme Court have an obligation to taxpayers to address this
problem and "straighten out this mess."' 95
192. See supra notes 183-187 and accompanying text.
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trott, J., dissenting).
